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our moral lives and take on a certain kind of identity, the identity of killers, for 
example, or the identity of masturbators or fornicators, if the acts in question are 
truly acts of killing, of masturbation, of fornication. And, I submit, we ought not 
to take on this identity, for this is an identity which is simply not the kind to be 
taken on by a human being, in particular the human being who has become one 
with Christ in and through baptism. 
Keane 's book is filled with a sense of concern for people and their needs. 
Unfortunately, in my judgment at any rate, the moral policy It articulates is one 
that is not responsive to the deepest needs of people. 
Recently (March, 1978), Richard A. McCormick , S.J., attempted to reformu-
late in a more compelling and persuasive manner the moral theory embodied in 
Keane's book and to show that those who reject this theory misrepresent it, 
misunderstand it, and argue in vicious circles (d. "Notes on Moral Theology, " 
Theological Studies , March, 1978). It is not possible here to discuss further the 
fundamental issues involved. But there is clearly a profound difference in the 
approach taken to moral questions in general and to issues in human sexuality in 
particular by writers who, like Keane, hold that it can be morally good directly to 
intend ontic evil and by many others who believe that it is morally wrong directly 
to intend, i.e. , set one's being, on evil, even if by doing so one can serve some very 
significant good . 
- William E. May 
Department of Theology 
Catholic University of America 
On Understanding Human Sexuality 
W. E. May and J. F. Harvey 
Franciscan Herald Press (Synthesis Series) , 1434 W. 51st St., Chicago, Ill. 60609, 
1977. 79pp., $1.50. 
The subtitle of this little volume tells it all: "A restatement of the position of 
The Roman Catholic Church on questions of sexuality written in response to 
Human Sexuality : New Directions in American Catholic Thought. " Human Sex-
uality by A. Kosnik , et. al. was published in June of 1977 by Paulist Press and has 
evoked widespread praise and condemnation. In fact , it has incurred official con-
demnation because it does not restate in detail official Catholic teaching. The 
May-Harvey endeavor is such a restatement. Although their effort, at times caus-
tic, is not a convincing one, it does provide a brief occasion to re-examine this 
mystery-laden phenomenon called human sexuality. 
The authors begin with an overview of Human Sexuality and then direct their 
analysis to the following topics: the meaning and purpose of "human sexuality", 
moral methodology, the use of Scripture and Christian tradition , the use of empir-
ical sciences, and the treatment of homosexuality. I shall comment on each topic 
according to the foregoing sequence. (Throughout this review the abbreviation HS 
will refer to Human Sexuality: New Directions in American Catholic Thought.) 
With regard to the meaning and purpose of "human sexuality," May and Har-
vey would have us note (p. 13) that the authors of HS in defining sexuality place 
"all their emphasis on the 'other-relating' aspect of sexuality; not a hint is offered 
that human sexuality is related to the generation of new human life" (this from p. 
83 of HS). There is no such hint at this point (although it is mentioned on the 
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following page, 84, in HS) because the relationship between sex and the genera-
tion of new life is self-evident and, more to the point, is not specifically human. 
May and Harvey make this objection because they believe that the generation of 
new human life is essential to an understanding of human sexuality. The differ-
ence in the two approaches is simply this: the authors of HS argue that pro-
creation is one dimension of human sexuality; May and Harvey argue that human 
beings are "animal persons" and that sexuality, to be truly human, must respect 
the procreative orientation as normative. In fact, May and Harvey accept the view 
of George Gilder that "the sexual drive ... is fundamentally procreative - the 
product of millions of years of human evolution designed to perpetuate the 
species" and, hence, the Human Sexuality authors "are leading the way to sexual 
suicide" because they have "loosened the tie between procreation and sexuality" 
(p. 19). Sexual suicide means the extinction of the species. In view of mind-
boggling population statistics today, the existence of sperm banks and the use of 
AID, the possibility of artificial inovulation and In vitro fertilization, and discus-
sions on cloning, the only path to the non-survival of the species is being paved by 
the manufacturers of thermonuclear weapons (approved by Vatican II) and by 
those who do not take demographic evidence seriously. 
May and Harvey quickly caution that "it is not necessary that human beings 
intend children in every act of genital intercourse" (p.19). The caution is curious 
and prompts some obvious questions: in which acts of genital intercourse must 
children be intended? in which acts may they be non-intended? May and Harvey 
do not answer the first question; on the contrary, they dismiss it by asserting that 
"that is not the question. Rather, the issue is the very meaning of our being as 
sexual persons and the relationship between procreation and sexuality" (p. 19). 
For the two authors anatomy is destiny. Nor do they consider what motive other 
than children might morally justify genital intercourse. I might observe too that as 
recently as 50 years ago a Catholic moralist (J. Mausbach) was suggesting that 
spouses need not intend children as long as they respect the natural procreative 
intention of the sex act itself. The answer to the second question, a hallmark of 
Catholic teaching and crucial in any discussion of sexual morality, is found on p. 
49 where May and Harvey refer to periodic abstinence - in a word, rhythm. This 
will be considered later under the heading "ChrisUan tradition" but we may note 
here that with the (then) new knowledge of reproductive biology, Pius XI sanc-
tioned this method of birth regulation and Pius XII taught that it could be used 
for serious "indications" throughout the entire duration of a marriage. Accord-
ingly, the charge that "they (the HS authors) offer a view of human sexuality that 
loosens the link between procreation and the genital expression of human sex-
uality" (p. 20) must be levelled against Casti Connubii. 
In their understanding the authors of HS include the procreative and unitive 
elements of the traditional formulation and argue that "creative growth toward 
integration" as a reformulation "represents a development of, rather than a depar-
ture from, the traditional formulation" (p. 86). May and Harvey reject this under-
standing of human sexuality as "woefully inadequate and in no way a 'develop-
ment' of the traditional understanding" (p. 15). In Dignitatis Humanae, the Dec-
laration on Religious Freedom, the bishops of Vatican II assert: " ... in taking up 
the matter of religious freedom this sacred Synod intends to develop the doctrine 
of recent Popes on the inviolable rights of the human person and on the constitu-
tional order of society" (Art. 1). But recent popes had departed from the doctrine 
of their predecessors, a departure which Vatican II emphatically canonizes (Art. 
2) in the name of development of Catholic doctrine. With good reason, therefore, 
the authors of HS can speak of development. 
May and Harvey begin their analysis of moral methodology (p. 21) by excerpt-
ing from the following statement on p. 89 of HS: "Vatican II called for a renewal 
of moral theology in which morality is seen as a vocation, a way of life, a total 
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response to God's invitation lived out from the depths of a person's being. Moral-
ity must never allow itself to be reduced to a simple external conformity to 
prejudged and prespecified patterns of behavior. For this reason, we find it woe-
fully inadequate to return to a method of evaluating human sexual behavior based 
on an abstract absolute predetermination of any sexual expressions as intrinsically 
evil and always immoral." May and Harvey then observe (p. 21): "They are 
correct in rejecting such simplistic and aprioristic ways of making moral evalua-
tions. " Unfortunately, the observation is mere lip service. For the authors are 
already (aprioristically) and unalterably committed to the stand that the official 
Catholic teaching on sexual ethics is valid and immutable. In rejecting the HS 
approach to moral evaluations, namely that the morality of an action cannot be 
determined apart from motive and circumstances (which means that an act cannot 
be said to be intrinsically evil (i.e. , evil independent of the other co-factors), May 
and Harvey simply recall the traditional teaching with some comment. In the 
tradition, the morality of an action was dependent on the object of the act of 
choice, the intention of the person making the choice, and the accompanying 
circumstances; moreover, for an act to be morally good all the factors had to be 
good. For those not familiar with this scholastic understanding it may be helpful 
to explain - as May and Harvey do correctly - that the object of the act of 
choice (the so-named formal object) gave to a human act its specific moral value, 
namely "a moral meaning that could not be changed by the agent's subjective 
intent." This specifying object was not the physical event itself that was per-
formed but " the externally observable performance as a purposeful or humanly 
significant deed .. . . The formal object of the act of choice had its own intelligibil-
ity" and as "the object of the inner act of choice . . . could not not be intended 
by the agent" (pp. 24 f.). What all this means, in other words, is that a given act 
has its own set purpose while the purpose of a given individual who chooses to 
perform this act mayor may not coincide with the purpose of the act itself. In 
context, the fundamental purpose (formal object) of sexual intercourse is pro-
creation; the purpose of individuals having intercourse may be other. A variety of 
motives is possible: pleasure, celebration, reconciliation, consolation, domination, 
monetary gain, etc. According to the traditional view, reasserted by May and 
Harvey , the specific morality (moral species) of an act is determined by its formal 
object. The authors of HS, following the thought of a number of respected con-
temporary moralists, highlight personal intention and accompanying circum-
stances (value factors) in value-judging the morality of an act. 
A Principal Difficulty 
One of the principal difficulties of the traditional moral methodology is the 
reputed "intelligibility" or set purpose of the formal object. With regard to sexual 
activity , May and Harvey and others assume and then attempt to show that there 
is an essential and inviolable connection between procreation and human sex-
uality . In describing the formal object of an act, May and Harvey speak of it as 
"the externally observable performance as a purposeful or humanly significant 
deed" (emphasis added). But human significance will vary as insights vary from 
era to era and culture to culture. The relationship between sexuality and procrea-
tion is necessarily biological but its human significance is not necessarily intrinsic. 
By way of comparison, one may ask in what the essence or intrinsic nature of 
parenthood consists. Is parenthood essentially biological? If it is, then the nurtur-
ing aspect of parenthood is an added or secondary consideration, the primary one 
being the aspect of begetting. Hence, adoptive parents are parents only in a 
manner of speaking. But as everyone knows - perhaps in particular adopted chil-
dren - adoptive parents, humanly speaking, are indeed truly parents. That is, the 
human significance of parenthood is not primarily the biological capacity to pro-
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create but the ability and willingness to care for children whether or not they be 
one 's own flesh and blood. As the old adage has it, parents are born when the first 
child arrives. Or, in the case of artificial insemination by a donor, in what human-
ly significant sense is a donor a parent? Clearly, the essence of parenting is not 
biological. 
In a footnote reference to the matter of exceptions to general norms in the 
teaching of Aquinas, May and Harvey observe that the understanding by the 
authors of HS and other moralists "obviously is not what Thomas intended" (n. 
24, pp. 72 f.). But it seems strange that something so obvious should escape the 
notice of such eminent moralists as J . Fuchs, L . Janssens, B. Schuller, R. 
McCormick and others. What is obvious is that Thomistic texts are open to inter-
pretation. (For example, St. Thomas does say - Summa Theol. 1-2·,7,4 - that the 
circumstance of intention is the "most principal cause of an act" [causa princi-
palissima) and "therefore a moral act is specified especially by reason of the end" 
which is "the motive and object of the will.") 
For the rest, May and Harvey choose not to give a detailed criticism of the 
methodology which they oppose; they refer, rather, to the authors who are argu-
ing it pro and con. They "do not recommend," however, "a return to the manuals 
of the moral theology of the past" because of the casuistic and legalistic nature of 
the manuals (p. 29). This non-recommendation is well founded in contemporary 
approaches to moral theology but coming from May and Harvey in the present 
context, it rings hollow. For · in the area of sexual ethical teaching, they are 
echoing the manuals all the way. It might be said that in their own regard and in 
that of like-minded authors this observation is superfluous; one cannot return to 
what one has never left. 
With regard to the use of scripture, in particular the review of biblical sources 
by the HS authors, May and Harvey recall the authors' "caution that one cannot 
validly abstract statements about sexuality from their context and apply them to 
contemporary situations. Yet they engage in their own form of universalizing" 
(pp. 31 f.). A few lines later May and Harvey admit "agreeing with the authors 
that the Scriptures do not provide an explicit and detailed sexual ethics or a set of 
absolute norms" (p. 32) - and then they proceed with an attempt to provide just 
that. They try to do this with the help of the well known E. Schillebeeckx and P. 
Grelot. They quote Schillebeeckx to the effect that whatever has been created by 
God, including marriage and family , "received, on creation, its intrinsic condi-
tions of existence, its defined limits. This intrinsic reality was none other than 
God's creative will which called an order, a system, into existence" (p. 33). (In 
the footnote to this citation - n. 45, p . 75 - May and Harvey incorrectly refer to 
pp. 20-21 of the work by Schillebeeckx; the correct reference is p. 24.) But had 
they read Schillebeeckx further, they would have found, on p. 287: "Although 
Christ had said that marriage was indissoluble, he had not said in what the anthro-
pological reality of marriage precisely consisted. In other words, precisely what 
was indissoluble?" Or, in other words, even if we accept on faith that God insti-
tuted marriage and family and that Christ wished to restore marriage to its pristine 
dignity, we still do not know what its "defined limits" are . The lived reality of 
marriage and family is a product of cultural conditioning, of evolution, and it is 
part of the task of theology to articulate insights appropriate to given times and 
cultures. This is what the authors of HS are trying to do. In discussing the 
inadequacy of abstract apprehensions of man, Bernard Lonergan (who, like 
Schillebeeckx, is not primarily known as an exegete) notes that this approach is 
not theological and adds: "I think our Scripture scholars would agree that its 
abstractness, and the omissions due to abstraction, have no foundation in the 
revealed word of God" (in "The Transition from a Classicist World View to 
Historical Mindedness" in J. E . Biechler, ed., Law For Liberty [Baltimore: Heli-
con, 1967], pp. 126-136, at pp. 129 f.). 
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The "quite defective exegesis" attributed by May and Harvey (p. 35) to the 
authors of HS is partly illustrated by the discussion of divorce and remarriage -
what Jesus said, what Paul meant, etc. (pp. 35-39). The discussion is, at best, 
speculatively interesting. But it would be instructive for May and Harvey to recall 
that the Eastern Orthodox tradition, among other Christian traditions, justifies 
divorce with the right to remarry and, according to Vatican II 's Decree on Ecu-
menism (Art. 15), "that it is of supreme importance to understand , venerate, 
preserve, and foster the exceedingly rich liturgical and spiritual heritage of the 
Eastern Churches, in order faithfully to preserve the fullness of Christian tradi-
tion." May and Harvey are, understandably enough, adducing authors who favor 
their own views, which means, in a word, that it is a question of exegetical 
probabilism. Their parting shot is unnecessary, namely that the authors of HS fail 
"to do full justice to the richness of the biblical teaching and its significance for 
understanding human sexuality" (p. 43). The HS authors would be the first to 
admit that no work will ever do full justice to the richness of biblical teaching in 
any regard. 
Aquinas Was Negative 
Concerning Christian tradition, May and Harvey are in error when they impute 
to the authors of HS "a very unbalanced view of Thomas' teaching" on marriage, 
conjugal intercourse and marital friendship (p. 44). Aquinas was decidedly nega-
tive regarding sexual intimacy in marriage even when marriage was "rendered 
honorable" by the compensatory goods of children and fidelity (this latter, mis-
understood by May and Harvey, meaning helping one's spouse to avoid adultery). 
Here are a few typical texts which are not taken out of context and which May 
and Harvey either do not know or else conveniently choose to ignore. Aquinas 
taught that only for childbearing does a man need a woman "since for any other 
work a man is more conveniently helped by another man than by a woman" and 
that "a woman is naturally subject to a man since in a man the discretion of 
reason is more in abundance" (Summa Theol. 1,92,1). He repeats this in 1,98,2 
and adds : "Brute animals lack reason. Hence it is that in sexual intercourse man 
becomes like a brute animal because he cannot moderate the pleasure of coitus 
and the heat of concupiscence." This sentiment is repeated in several places, as is 
the following one: "The use of sex keeps the soul back from that perfect inten-
tion of tending toward God" (ibid., 2-2,186,4). So too is this passage from 
Augustine: "I think there is nothing which perverts a man's mind more than the 
caresses of a woman and that bodily contact without which a wife cannot be had" 
(ibid., and also in his commentary on I Cor.). For St. Thomas conjugal intercourse 
is truly conjugal, and therefore sinless, only when it is motivated by the desire for 
procreation or for rendering the debt, a motive that must be explicit at the time 
of intercourse; "otherwise there is always sin involved, at least venial" (Suppl. 49, 
5). Finally, after reviewing the opinions concerning whether marriage was a sac-
rament that conferred grace, a disputed issue since marriage is so sexual, Aquinas 
concludes that the affirmative opinion is "more probable" (ibid., 42 ,3). These and 
other passages could have been but are not adduced by the authors of HS; the 
point is, these authors do not misrepresent St. Thomas' teaching. In fact, they do 
say - contrary to the misleading assertion by May and Harvey that the HS authors 
"do not even mention" (p. 44) what is positive in Aquinas - that "Thomas' 
synthesis of the human reality of marriage as both a civil and sacramental institu-
tion was unparalleled in previous writings, and it marked a high point in the 
scholastic discussion of marriage and sexuality" (p. 41 of HS). An explication of 
his views on friendship between spouses would not have balanced things since 
Aquinas does not and, in view of the earlier tradition, cannot speak positively of 
the affective overtones of intercourse, viz., of sexual lovemaking within marriage. 
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May and Harvey are in error too when they charge misuse of the documents of 
Vatican II. For example, they supply a concluding sentence to a paragraph in Art. 
51 of Gaudium et Spes, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
World, which the HS authors do not cite: "Relying on these principles, sons of the 
Church may not undertake methods of regulating procreation which are found 
blameworthy by the teaching authority of the Church in its unfolding of the 
divine law" (p. 45). Except for completeness, there was no urgent need to cite this 
since it does not resolve anything. If it did, there would have been no need to take 
the issue . of contraception out of the Council and entrust it to a special papal 
commission. It is recalled simply to bolster the aprioristic approach taken by May 
and Harvey, an approach that ultimately rests on authority. The full text refers to 
"objective standards" in judging the morality of an action, and May and Harvey 
would have done better to explain where these standards come from and to 
explain, as well, the meaning of "divine law." The authors of the Minority Report 
of that special commission were more on target when they admitted: "If we could 
bring forward arguments which are clear and cogent based on reason alone, it 
would not be necessary for our commission to exist . ... It depends on the nature 
of human life and human sexuality, as understood theologically by the church" 
(in R. Hoyt, ed., The Birth Control Debate [Kansas City, Mo: The National 
Catholic Reporter Publishing Co., 1968], pp. 34,36). The past theological under-
standing has been quite checkered (recall the views of Aquinas), and the Church 
today is better understood as the whole people of God , not the hierarchical 
magisterium. Why discuss anything if, in the final analysis, authority is decisive 
anyway? In point of historical fact, as May and Harvey should well realize, any 
number of instances can be recalled in which papal teaching has been negated. We 
can reflect with profit on Art. 59 of Gaudium et Spes in which "the ability ... to 
make personal judgments" is emphasized, and on Art. 3 of Dignitatis Humanae 
which stresses "personal assent" to truth. In the discussion of contraception the 
HS authors do discuss the theological respectability of dissent (pp. 117 ff.) which 
May and Harvey somehow fail to note. 
Complaint by May and Harvey 
The latter complain that "although they cite (p. 115) the words that deal with 
the need to respect the full meaning of mutual self-giving and human procreation, 
they do not comment on their significance for our understanding of human sex-
uality" (p. 45). On the contrary, the HS authors do comment; on p . 119 they 
repeat the passage and supply three pages of commentary. Because the authors of 
HS refer to periodic abstinence under the heading "Methods of Contraception" 
(pp. 292-295) - the additional references by May and Harvey to pp. 184 and 296 
are incorrect (p. 50) - the latter object that these authors "do not understand 
what is entailed in contraception" (p. 50). Despite the essential element of time 
and the scientific use of thermometers and other paraphernalia, for May and 
Harvey the commonly spoken of rhythm "method" of birth control is not a 
"method" of contraception; in other words, for them the divine law is followed 
when one can scientifically predict the time of ovulation in order that intercourse 
can be enjoyed when conception can be avoided. They thereby reflect the truth of 
Gerald Vann's wry comment that in this matter the Church forbids contrivances 
but permits contrivance! May and Harvey, as noted earlier, accuse the authors of 
HS of separating procreation from sexuality; for their part May and Harvey do not 
see rhythm as such a separation. However, since they did not notice the com-
mentary on pp. 119 ff. (as noted above) , we might cite a pertinent passage here in 
which the authors of HS say that the birth control controversy "in no way 
contests the fundamental fact that there is a connection between the procreative 
and unitive aspects of the conjugal act that needs to be respected." It is a question 
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of how one interprets this relationship; the HS authors do not regard the exclusive 
reliance "on a non-interference with the biological processes as the integrating 
element" (pp. 121 f. ). 
Perhaps more incredibly, May and Harvey fault the HS authors because they do 
not "seriously consider the lived experience of many Catholic couples - and non-
Catholic couples as well - who abstain from the great good of marital inter-
course" because they would otherwise "be forced to repudiate the meaning of 
their sexuality by contraceptive intercourse" (p. 50). This is incredible because, 
for one thing, May and Harvey themselves do not discuss the value of lived human 
experience in any regard, and they do not substantiate what this "lived exper-
ience" is for the Catholic and other couples to whom they refer. For another, 
there is absolutely no evidence that those who use contraceptives experience a 
repudiation of the meaning of their sexuality or a detracting from their love. The 
unfortunate experience of many who have resorted to rhythm is better articulated 
but is not alluded to by May and Harvey . Moreover, there is an abundance of 
opportunity for asceticism in marriage quite apart from periodic abstinence. In 
point of fact, however, the HS authors do affirm: "Natural family planning 
deserves serious consideration among the alternatives for exercising responsible 
parenthood" (p. 128). 
In criticizing the use of the empirical sciences in HS, namely that the normative 
function of these sciences is left undetermined, May and Harvey offer nothing 
constructive. They might have recalled Art. 62 of Gaudium et Spes which urges 
that we make "appropriate use ... of the findings of the secular sciences." These 
sciences are inexact, and surely no one would argue that only those findings may 
be used which reinforce official Catholic teaching or that Catholic scholars in the 
course of their research cannot be open to the possibility of finding evidence that 
does not support such official teaching. May and Harvey charge that "no clear 
criteria are given of what the authors (of HS) hold to be good for 'human develop-
ment' " regarding the various forms of sexual activity (pp. 51 f.). However, these 
criteria are detailed in the following chapter, especially pp. 92-95: self-liberating, 
other-enriching, honest, faithful, socially responsible, life-serving, and joyous. 
The treatment of homosexuality by May and Harvey is standard fare to be 
found, with the same casuistry, in any manual of moral theology - that genre, it 
will be recalled, to which May and Harvey do not recommend a return. 
In sum, May and Harvey believe that they have offered " massive evidence" 
and " devastating criticism" to show that the HS authors "have done a disservice 
to truth and to the Catholic community" (pp. 68 f.). The evidence is not massive 
and the criticism is hardly devastating. On Understanding Human Sexuality is a 
hastily written misunderstanding and, at $1.50, is overpriced. 
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